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This article examines the implications for the international trade environment of public 
and private standards for food safety and food quality. Public (mandatory) standards 
are a response to a perceived market failure and include mandatory risk assessment 
procedures, restrictions on harmful products, and labelling requirements. Disparate 
public standards create challenges for international trading partners and are dealt with 
through the WTO SPS and TBT Agreements. Private standards for food safety and 
quality are becoming a prominent feature of international food markets and include 
proprietary, consensus and third-party standards. The WTO has no jurisdiction over 
private standards. Key questions include whether private standards divert or reduce 
trade or whether they can be trade enhancing, and under what conditions. The 
implications for the WTO are discussed, and future trade policy research needs 
pertaining to the co-existence of public and private standards for food safety and 
quality are identified. 
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s food markets evolve with new technologies emerging, increased product 
differentiation and more affluent consumers, there is heightened focus on food 
safety and quality. Regulatory systems have responded with new product and 
production standards, approval processes, risk assessment processes and labelling 
requirements while, at the same time, a plethora of private food safety and quality 
standards have emerged alongside these regulatory developments. This article 
examines implications for the international trade environment of public and private 
standards for food safety and food quality. Key questions include whether private 
standards are trade diverting (even trade reducing) or can be trade enhancing and 
under what conditions, and the implications for the WTO of the growth in private 
standards.  
The article begins by examining public standards, briefly outlining the underlying 
case for market failure, examining the challenges that disparate public standards 
create for international trading partners and considering how the WTO addresses trade 
measures that arise from differences in public standards for food safety and food 
quality. The article then turns to a consideration of private standards, examining the 
scope of private standards that have emerged, and addressing the potential trade 
effects (diverting or enhancing) of private standards. The article concludes with a 
discussion of the implications for the WTO and identifies future trade policy research 
needs pertaining to the co-existence of public and private standards for food safety 
and quality. 
Public Standards 
andatory public (regulatory) standards carry with them a legal obligation for 
compliance and are a response to a perceived market failure; as such they are 
often implemented in the presence of negative externalities, to ensure the provision of 
public goods, or to mitigate information asymmetry. Examples include mandatory 
food safety management practices, pesticide residue limits and waste water treatment 
regulations for the protection of the environment and human health, and prohibitions 
on specific confinement practices for livestock in the interests of animal welfare. 
Other examples include requirements for mandatory labelling of nutritional content in 
a consistent format, requirements for labelling the presence of allergens and 
production and labelling standards for use of the term “organic”. 
In the case of food safety, the HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Points) system has been adopted in a number of countries both on a voluntary and a 
mandatory basis. HACCP is a food safety management plan which involves the 
systematic analysis and control of biological, chemical and physical hazards within a 
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production process. In Canada and the United States, HACCP systems are mandatory 
for federally registered processing plants in a number of sectors including meat, fish 
and seafood. Regulations pertaining to animal welfare are also on the rise: the EU is 
phasing in a ban on the use of battery cages for layer hens, effective 2012, while bans 
on the use of confinement pens (gestation crates) for sows are in place in some 
jurisdictions (e.g., the EU and some U.S. states).
1 Mandatory food labelling 
requirements exist in many jurisdictions and address multiple issues. In Canada, 
nutrition labelling became mandatory for all prepackaged foods in December 2007, 
while the United States put in place similar requirements in the 1990s and the EU has 
taken steps to harmonize food nutrition labelling standards across member states. 
More recently, a requirement to label the presence (quantity) of trans fats has been 
incorporated into food labelling regulations in many countries. 
Regulatory intervention to govern the use of food labelling terms is ongoing, and 
includes recent proposals to overhaul the use of the “Product of Canada” designator 
on food products. Canada implemented regulations in 2009 requiring mandatory 
certification to the new National Organic Standard for any agricultural product 
represented as organic, and developed an official federal organic logo. The United 
States and the EU (among others) already had organic production and certification 
standards in place; each jurisdiction has developed separate national (supranational) 
standards, which often differ with respect to requirements for on-farm production 
processes (e.g., size of buffer zones) or required percentage of organic content 
(Sawyer, Kerr and Hobbs, 2008). 
As in the case of organic standards, when different mandatory standards exist in 
different countries we have a recipe for potential trade tensions. Clearly, differences in 
public standards across countries may arise for legitimate reasons: different social 
objectives and priorities, differences in resource endowments and the availability of 
resources for implementing new production standards, or differences in the political 
economy of decision-making and the role of stakeholder groups in the policy process. 
However, regulatory requirements limiting the use of certain production technologies, 
or requiring identification and verification of specific inputs, have implications for the 
competitiveness of the agri-food sector in these jurisdictions relative to the agri-food 
sector in jurisdictions governed by fewer regulations. The potential negative trade 
effects are two-fold: there may be domestic pressure to regulate or restrict imports that 
do not meet these standards in the interests of creating a so-called level playing field, 
and high compliance costs may encourage relocation of production to third countries 
and precipitate calls for compensatory payments to domestic producers to prevent this 
from occurring. Jill E. Hobbs 
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Grethe (2007) discusses these issues in the context of high animal welfare 
standards in the EU, comparing the potential trade outcomes from different policies 
aimed at preventing the creation of “low animal welfare havens”, wherein production 
moves to countries with lower welfare standards. The policy options examined 
include labelling of non-animal-friendly imports (mandatory or voluntary), 
compensation of domestic producers through subsidies, tariff discrimination based on 
production processes, import bans, and the negotiation of new multilateral agreements 
addressing animal welfare. As Grethe argues, there is only weak theoretical 
justification for policies to prevent relocation that go beyond labelling schemes to 
address information asymmetry. In reality, however, these policies have been under 
consideration: the EU proposed an international agreement on trade rules pertaining to 
animal welfare (Hobbs et al., 2002), and compensatory payments to producers for the 
adoption of more stringent animal welfare protocols are already in effect within the 
EU (Grethe, 2007). Compensatory payments are inherently distortionary, particularly 
as they disadvantage producers in third countries that comply with equivalent 
standards but are not compensated for compliance costs. While tariff discrimination 
avoids the third-country effects, it is incompatible with WTO disciplines. A ban on 
imports on the basis of production methods would likely also be inconsistent with 
WTO obligations, as evidenced by the EU ban on beef produced using growth-
promoting hormones, a ban that was successfully challenged by the United States and 
Canada through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
2 (Kerr and Hobbs, 2002). 
WTO Rules 
Given that differences in the level, coverage and implementation of regulatory 
standards for food safety and food quality have the potential to create challenges for 
the WTO, it is useful to review how the WTO deals with trade measures that stem 
from differences in public standards for food safety and quality. The mandate of the 
WTO to remove barriers to international trade rests on the core principle of non-
discrimination, which is described by three concepts: like products; national 
treatment; and most-favoured nation status. The concept of like products prohibits 
discrimination (the imposition of trade barriers) from being implemented on the basis 
of process and production methods (PPMs). Trade rules are supposed to group goods 
according to their end use rather than the means by which they were produced, the 
rationale being that it is goods, not PPMs, that are traded (Hobbs et al., 2002). A 
second core component of the principle of non-discrimination is national treatment, 
which means that like goods from foreign sources should be granted market access 
treatment equivalent to the treatment of like goods produced in the domestic market. Jill E. Hobbs 
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  Finally, the most-favoured nation concept means that all like goods from foreign 
sources should be treated equally – granted the same market access – as like goods 
from the country granted the most favourable market access. 
The principle of non-discrimination is the default principle unless exceptions are 
agreed to. GATT Article XX, on general exceptions, permits a number of trade 
measures, including those deemed “necessary to protect public morals” or “necessary 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health” or measures “relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources” (Hobbs et al., 2002). In some cases, the 
argument for trade measures for the “protection of public morals” is fairly 
straightforward, for example, a ban on the importation of pornographic materials. The 
“conservation of exhaustible natural resources” argument featured in the 1998 WTO 
ruling on the U.S. Shrimp–Turtle case, in which the WTO Appellate Body upheld a 
U.S. ban on the importation of shrimps harvested using methods that harmed sea 
turtles. As a number of authors have observed, the application of Article XX to ethical 
issues related to food production, such as animal welfare, is ambiguous (Blandford 
and Fulponi, 1999; Grethe, 2007). Expanding the “protection of public morals” to 
include ethical issues related to food production would open a Pandora’s box of 
exceptions to WTO rules, setting an unwelcome precedent that could open up Article 
XX to a wide variety of discriminatory trade measures on the basis of labour 
standards, environmental standards, etc. (Hobbs et al., 2002; Grethe, 2007). 
Under the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS), WTO members are permitted to impose trade measures “necessary to 
protect human health, animal or plant life and health”. Public standards pertaining to 
food safety therefore fall under the remit of the SPS Agreement, which requires that 
any trade measures relating to food safety or an animal or plant disease be based on a 
scientific risk assessment. The WTO defers to external organizations for the 
establishment of internationally agreed standards and definitions of what constitutes 
an acceptable risk assessment, for example, the Codex Alimentarius Commission in 
the case of food products and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) in the 
case of animal health. 
Public (mandatory) standards pertaining to food labelling, packaging 
requirements, technical standards, etc., including those dealing with production and 
processing methods, fall under the remit of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT). As with the SPS Agreement, any trade measures imposed under the 
TBT Agreement must conform to the GATT principle of non-discrimination, including 
the stipulation that “like” products be treated the same. Whereas the SPS Agreement 
appeals to a scientific basis for determining the legitimacy of trade measures, clearly Jill E. Hobbs 
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this is not possible for disputes that arise over the potentially discriminatory nature of 
food labelling rules or technical standards. The TBT Agreement stipulates that 
members should base labelling requirements, standards, etc. on internationally agreed 
standards. It has been argued that the TBT Agreement is ambiguous or provides only 
limited guidance regarding the legitimacy of process-based regulations (Josling et al., 
2004). 
Nevertheless, the history of WTO dispute panel rulings with respect to a number 
of prominent recent trade disputes over food safety and food quality indicates that the 
WTO mechanisms do offer a means by which to address differences in public 
standards, albeit slowly in terms of the commercial losses that accrue before a dispute 
is resolved. The ruling in the U.S. Shrimp–Turtle case upheld a trade restriction based 
on the negative impacts of harvesting technologies on a protected species, while a 
1991 GATT panel ruling in the U.S.-Mexico Tuna–Dolphin case produced a different 
outcome. Mexico challenged a U.S. ban on imports of tuna from countries that could 
not prove that their fishing methods avoided unnecessary harm to dolphins. A 1991 
GATT panel ruled that a country could not ban imports for environmental reasons 
when the “exhaustible natural resource” lay outside its territorial jurisdiction. 
However, while a ban on imports was prohibited, the GATT panel also ruled that the 
United States had the right to label its domestic products as “dolphin-safe” (Blandford 
and Fulponi, 1999).  
The long-running beef hormone dispute between the European Union and the 
United States and Canada, wherein the United States and Canada challenged the EU 
ban on beef produced using sub-therapeutic growth hormones was an important test 
case for the SPS Agreement. The EU argued that the ban was justified given consumer 
concerns over the use of this technology and, while the WTO panel ruled against the 
import ban, the EU chose to retain the import ban and accept retaliation. The beef 
hormone dispute highlights the challenges for the WTO architecture in dealing with 
protectionist pressure from consumer interests. The standard result from the partial 
equilibrium trade model that underlies the WTO infrastructure is that trade 
liberalization – the removal of trade barriers, the lowering of trade restrictions – 
benefits consumers through lower prices and concomitant gains in consumer surplus. 
Thus, it is inefficient domestic producers, not consumers, who are expected to ask for 
protection from imports. Once we recognize that many food markets are characterized 
by both horizontal and vertical quality differentiation, such that some consumers 
might differ in their perceptions as to what constitutes “high” quality, and that many 
of these food attributes have credence properties, it is plausible that some consumers 
will ask for an import ban or mandatory labelling for products they perceive as Jill E. Hobbs 
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harmful or of lower quality.
3 Two key impending issues include the diverging public 
standards governing farm animal welfare, which seem a likely source of future trade 
disputes, and the introduction of mandatory country-of-origin labelling in the United 
States for a number of food commodities, including livestock and meat, which 
triggered a WTO challenge from Canada and led to the establishment of a WTO 
dispute settlement panel in November 2009 (WTO, 2010). While public standards for 
food quality and food safety continue to evolve, and evidently may sometimes lead to 
trade disputes, there has been a proliferation of private standards for food safety and 
food quality. The WTO has no jurisdiction over private standards.   
Private Standards 
rivate standards for food safety and food quality can be distinguished on two 
dimensions: the source or scope of the standard and the economic function of the 
standard. Table 1 summarizes these dimensions and provides examples of each 
category of standard. Private standards emerge from a variety of sources and include 
proprietary standards established by firms, third-party standards established by 
independent standard-setting bodies and other non-governmental organizations, and 
voluntary consensus standards established by industry bodies or coalitions of firms. 
Private standards can also be distinguished by the economic functions they perform, 
including product differentiation, supply chain management, and liability reduction or 
protection of a firm’s (industry’s) reputation.  
Private standards can enhance product differentiation if the standard is 
communicated to consumers through labelling or the presence of a logo on the final 
consumer product, both of which act as quality signals. Alternatively, the primary 
purpose of a private standard could be to enhance supply chain management by 
improving information flows and reducing transaction costs in the supply chain. 
Finally, private standards may serve primarily to reduce liability as a component of a 
due diligence defence in the event of a food safety problem. If effective, private 
standards can reduce transaction costs by facilitating longer-term supply chain 
relationships and in doing so lowering both the search costs of finding reliable 
suppliers and the monitoring costs of ensuring the quality of supplies. For this reason, 
a credible system of verification (often by a third-party certification body) is a 
necessary component of most private standards systems, both proprietary and 
consensus. While ostensibly voluntary, private standards can be de facto mandatory if 
a majority of the market adopts the standard as a requirement (Henson, 2006; Henson 
and Reardon, 2005). 
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Table 1  Categorizing Private Standards 
Functions   Proprietary Consensus  Third  party 
Product differentiation  99    9? 
Enhance supply chain 
management  99  9  99 
Reduce liability/protect 














Proprietary standards are those put in place by individual firms and are unique to 
the firm. The examples provided in table 1 are private standards established by 
retailers. The UK food retailer Tesco PLC established its “Nature’s Choice” standard 
for suppliers of fresh produce in 1991. The codes of practice enshrined in the standard 
cover the use of crop inputs, pollution prevention, wildlife and landscape 
conservation, energy conservation and protection of human health (farm labour). An 
annual, independent third-party audit is used to monitor compliance with the standard 
(Tesco, 2010). The retailer has similar codes of practice for livestock products. 
Walmart has various supply chain management standards with which its suppliers 
must comply and which are aimed at enhancing efficiencies within the company’s 
distribution system. It has also implemented a proprietary Ethical Standards Program 
(ESP), which sets out a series of labour and environmental standards for suppliers   Jill E. Hobbs 
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(Walmart, 2010). Proprietary standards can therefore serve multiple functions. 
 In both of the examples provided here, product differentiation is clearly a primary 
objective, although enhanced supply chain management also features in Walmart’s 
standards. The extent to which proprietary standards reduce liability and/or protect 
reputation (brand name capital) depends on the effectiveness of the standard in 
reducing the risks of food safety problems or assuring specific quality attributes, 
including the extent to which the standards are monitored or enforced. 
Voluntary consensus standards represent another group of private standards and 
are established by coalitions of firms or industries to serve a collective purpose. 
Government may be involved, for example in facilitating the establishment of the 
standards, or these may be entirely private sector initiatives. Consensus standards have 
some of the properties of a club good: they are non-rivalrous but somewhat 
excludable. The benefits are shared among a specific group of firms – the “club”, the 
costs of providing the good are shared among the club members and the benefits are 
limited to club members. As with other club goods, enforceable property rights are 
important as they allow for the exclusion necessary for the club to function. In the 
absence of effective property rights, non-members could free-ride on the benefits 
produced by club members. Examples of consensus standards for food safety and food 
quality include initiatives from coalitions of food retailers, such as GLOBALGAP and 
the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), while the Assured Food Standards program 
(the so-called Red Tractor program) is driven by a coalition of agricultural producer 
organizations in the UK.  
GLOBALGAP, originally established as EUREPGAP in 1997, is a set of “good 
agricultural practice” (GAP) standards pertaining to food safety, the environment, 
animal welfare and worker health and safety. It is a business-to-business standard 
aimed at improving food safety and quality rather than providing quality signals 
directly to consumers; products are not usually labelled with a GLOBALGAP logo on 
the retail market. GLOBALGAP establishes a baseline set of minimum standards for a 
range of commodities, from fresh fruit and vegetables, flowers and aquaculture to 
livestock, combinable crops and feed manufacturing. The driving force behind the 
establishment of these consensus standards was a coalition of European food retailers 
(The Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group – EUREP) wishing to develop a common 
set of food safety and quality standards for suppliers of fresh produce and other 
agricultural commodities. Independent third-party audits are used to verify 
compliance with GLOBALGAP standards.
4 Thus, the primary motivations were 
improved management of the supply chain, including reducing the transaction costs of 
sourcing reliable supplies, and reducing the retailers’ exposure to the negative liability Jill E. Hobbs 
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and reputation effects from food safety problems. Product differentiation is likely a 
minor objective given that the GLOBALGAP standards are not proprietary to one 
retailer. 
The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), launched in May 2000 by CIES – The 
Food Business Forum – is a retailer-led attempt to build a common forum for 
benchmarking accepted food safety standards and provides another example of 
voluntary consensus standards. The GFSI is not involved directly in certification or 
accreditation activities. Rather than being a standard itself, the GFSI generates 
guidance documents that assist in the establishment of standards defining food safety 
management practices and good agricultural practices based on common principles. 
The benchmarking process establishes whether a standard and its certification system 
can demonstrate compliance with the GFSI guidance document. For example, the 
GFSI acknowledges a number of food safety standards, including the BRC (British 
Retail Consortium) Global Standard, the Dutch HACCP code, the EFSIS (European 
Food Safety Inspection Services) standards, the IFS (International Food Standard) and 
the SQF 2000 (Safe Quality Food) code originating in Australia (GFSI, 2004). It is an 
attempt to consolidate private food safety standards to reduce duplication. As with the 
GLOBALGAP standards, the primary economic function relates to efficient 
management of supply chain relationships and reductions in transaction costs. Based 
on a series of interviews with sixteen leading food retailers and four standards owners 
across a number of OECD countries, Fulponi (2005) reports an intention among 
retailers to eventually source 100 percent of supplies through a GFSI benchmarked 
standard, but an acknowledgement from most firms that they will probably continue to 
add proprietary, firm-specific standards. 
The third example of a consensus standard provided in table 1 is the Assured Food 
Standards program established by a coalition of producer organizations in the United 
Kingdom. Unlike the GLOBALGAP and GFSI standards, the “Red Tractor” logo of 
the Assured Food Standards program features prominently on food labels and acts as a 
signalling mechanism in consumer markets. The program provides quality assurances 
with respect to food safety, animal welfare, environment, and country of origin (UK). 
Finally, there are third-party private standards, such as the ISO (International 
Organisation for Standardization) quality management and environmental standards, 
or food quality standards established by non-governmental organisations or other 
third-party interest groups to verify a range of food quality credence attributes, often 
relating to on-farm production methods. Table 1 provides the example of an animal 
welfare standard established and certified by the SPCA (Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals) in Canada. While the ISO standards tend to be business-to-Jill E. Hobbs 
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business standards that reduce transaction costs and facilitate supply chain 
management efficiencies, other third-party standards such as the SPCA standard act 
primarily as quality heuristics in consumer markets. 
Potential Trade Effects of Private Standards 
Do private standards for food safety and food quality divert or reduce trade, or can 
they instead facilitate international trade? The chief argument for private standards 
having a deleterious impact on international trade revolves around the burden of 
compliance costs. These can be significant, particularly if a majority of the market 
requires adherence to private standards, making them de facto mandatory, and 
particularly in the case of developing countries (Henson, 2006). The burden of 
compliance tends to be higher on exporters from countries with lower public 
standards, given the more extensive upgrading and investments in technical capacity 
required. Indeed, both public and private standards for food safety and quality can be 
a challenge for developing countries in terms of the costs of compliance given 
infrastructure challenges, including the capacity for verification, certification and 
testing. If these effects are substantial, private standards can be trade diverting, putting 
exporters in some developing countries at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis 
exporters in countries with higher public standards for food safety and quality. An 
alternative view, however, is that compliance with the food safety and quality 
standards of importing countries has a positive effect, acting as a catalyst driving 
infrastructure improvements and investment in developing countries, in which case 
the effect could be to increase trade flows. There is a dearth of empirical studies 
examining the impact of food safety and quality standards on trade between 
developing and developed countries, and most are confined to public standards or 
international third-party (ISO) standards.
5 
Proprietary private standards may be trade reducing if they require asset-specific 
investments by suppliers in order to meet the idiosyncratic production protocols of a 
specific buyer. Increasing concentration in the food retailing sector compounds this 
problem, wherein access to global supply chains is channelled through a relatively 
small number of multinational firms. Though as Williamson (1986) observes, even a 
competitive market can reduce to one of bilateral dependency once asset-specific 
investments have been made. This leads to the classic hold-up problem, where 
investments can be inhibited by the risk that a buyer could act opportunistically ex 
post to appropriate rents once the supplier has made an asset-specific investment. 
Embedding requirements for significant asset-specific investments within proprietary 
codes of practice or private standards without the requisite contractual safeguards to Jill E. Hobbs 
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guard against opportunistic recontracting by the buyer is problematic.  Ceteris 
paribus, either suppliers will need to receive a risk premium sufficient to offset the 
risk of opportunistic behaviour by the buyer, or in the long run these supply chain 
relationships will be contractually unstable (Williamson, 1986). Contractual 
safeguards in this context could include required codes of practice that are 
unequivocal and communicated clearly to suppliers; retailer investments in brand-
name capital (reputation) that would be damaged by repeated opportunistic behaviour 
toward suppliers; and the use of independent third-party auditors to verify suppliers’ 
compliance. Voluntary consensus standards are less subject to asset specificity 
problems, particularly if they encompass multiple suppliers and multiple buyers and 
are the dominant collective private standard. 
The trade-facilitating effects of private standards include their potential to 
engender faster harmonization of standards, access to multiple supply chains and 
greater product differentiation. As Henson (2006) observes, the processes of 
harmonization and mutual recognition (equivalence) among private standards may be 
occurring more quickly than is possible for national public standards, particularly 
those that require multilateral negotiations. Indeed, the GFSI is an example of a 
coordinated attempt to formalize mutual recognition of equivalence between various 
private food safety standards. Provided that retailers do not treat consensus standards 
as a base to which they add additional proprietary standards, a widely adopted 
consensus standard that encompasses a number of major food retailers in different 
countries, such as GLOBALGAP (EUREPGAP), can provide suppliers who comply 
with the standard with access to multiple supply chains in multiple countries. Finally, 
private standards for food safety and food quality encourage product differentiation 
and could lead to differentiated markets. It is likely that this would encourage trade in 
(higher value) differentiated food products. 
Clearly, private standards can be trade enhancing, diverting or reducing under 
different circumstances, and the outcome can be expected to differ across products or 
industries. The extent to which asset-specific investments are required, the current 
status of food safety and food quality standards in an exporting region (hence the costs 
of the “compliance gap”), the competitive structure of the food retailing sector, and 
the degree to which private standards are primarily proprietary or widely adopted 
consensus standards are likely to be some of the key determinants of the trade impact 
of private standards. Empirical work to examine the effects of private standards on 
trade is needed.  
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Empirical Challenges  
Previous empirical analysis of the effects of food safety standards on trade has tended 
to focus on public mandatory standards (see, for example, Peterson and Orden, 2005; 
Otuski et al., 2001). In a recent analysis, Anders and Caswell (2009) examine the 
impact on seafood imports of the implementation of mandatory HACCP by the United 
States in 1997. Using a gravity model, the authors show that the effect of mandatory 
HACCP for developed-country exporters to the United States was positive, while 
exports from developing countries as a group were negatively affected, apparently 
supporting the view of “standards as barriers” rather than “standards as catalysts” for 
this group. However, a further, disaggregated analysis at a country level reveals a 
more nuanced picture: regardless of development status, larger seafood exporters 
gained from the introduction of stricter food safety regulations. Both developed and 
developing countries feature within this group, indicating that country-specific factors 
need to be taken into account before conclusions can be drawn about the effect of 
higher food safety standards on developing countries.  
In an examination of the effect of private standards on food trade, Mitchell (2008) 
uses a gravity model to investigate the relationship between the adoption of 
EUREPGAP standards in Switzerland and the EU and international trade in fresh 
produce and nuts. The analysis compares trade patterns in these products with the 
United States, where EUREPGAP standards have not been adopted. Mitchell was 
unable to find significant differences in trading patterns pre and post EUREPGAP 
adoption. Clearly, one of the challenges with this type of analysis is determining when 
standards are de facto in place, since private standards are adopted as part of ongoing 
business decisions within firms, unlike a mandatory public standard that encompasses 
an entire sector and comes into force on a specific date. Controlling for other 
differences which may be affecting the trade flows between the markets is also 
necessary. Case study analyses would allow closer examination of the micro-level 
product and industry-specific factors that determine the trade impact of private 
standards (e.g., costs of compliance, differences in asset-specific investments, etc.). 
While it is difficult to generalize beyond the specific cases, case study analyses can 
help inform the design of future empirical work. 
Conclusions  
The WTO is a collection of member governments; it deals with the rules of trade 
between nations and is a forum through which nations negotiate with other nations 
regarding policies and regulations that restrict trade. Actual trade (transactions) 
usually occurs between private firms. Clearly the WTO has no jurisdiction over Jill E. Hobbs 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                 ____________   149 
 
private firms or the standards established by private firms or groups of firms. Yet the 
widespread adoption of private standards for food safety and quality undoubtedly 
influences supply chain relationships and access to markets. Analysis of the trade 
impacts of both public and private standards continues to be relevant. 
Given its jurisdictional limits the WTO offers no mechanism through which to 
challenge private standards, even though a dominant voluntary consensus standard can 
become de facto mandatory in a market. Although the SPS Agreement does charge 
member states with taking “reasonable measures” to ensure that non-governmental 
entities comply with the SPS Agreement, suggesting that there may be a role for 
governments in ensuring that private standards are in compliance with a country’s 
WTO obligations, it nevertheless seems unlikely that “non-governmental bodies” 
would include private standards that are facilitating business-to-business transactions 
(Henson, 2006). In 2003 St. Vincent and the Grenadines raised a concern at the SPS 
committee over requirements for EUREPGAP certification for fresh fruits, leading to 
ongoing discussions of private standards at the SPS committee. These discussions 
appear to have focused primarily on issues of technical co-operation and strategies for 
facilitating compliance; for example, a joint UNCTAD/WTO informal information 
session on private standards was held in 2007 (WTO, 2008). 
The extension of WTO jurisdiction over private standards is hard to envision and 
would be an unwelcome departure from its role as gatekeeper of the rules of trade 
between nations (not firms). Nevertheless, private standards for food safety and 
quality, as a legitimate market response to changing consumer preferences and 
evolving global supply chains, are here to stay and likely to gain in importance. 
Economic analysis, including case studies and quantitative analyses, that examines the 
underlying factors determining whether these standards divert, reduce or enhance 
trade on a specific country, industry and product level is necessary and can help 
inform strategies for adapting to and complying with these standards. 
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Endnotes 
                                                      
1. In 2002, voters in Florida passed a ballot initiative amending state legislation to 
prohibit gestation stalls in pig production beginning in 2008; Arizona voters passed 
a ballot initiative in 2006 to prohibit the use of gestation stalls and veal crates by 
the end of 2012; similar initiatives have recently passed into law in Colorado and 
California (American Veterinary Medical Association, 2008a, 2008b).  
2. It is worth noting that the EU chose to maintain the import ban in return for 
accepting retaliation against other EU imports. 
3. See Kerr (2010) for a detailed examination of these issues. 
4. See www.eurepgap.org and www.globalgap.org 
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